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Abstract— Transition between Separation Management in ATM
and Collision Avoidance constitutes a source of potential risks due
to non-coherent detection and resolution clearances between them.
To explore an operational integration between these two safety
nets, a complexity metric tailored for both Separation
Management and Collision Avoidance, based on the intrinsic
complexity, is proposed.
To establish the framework to compare the complexity metric with
current Collision Avoidance detection metrics, a basic pair-wise
encounter model has been considered. Then, main indicators for
horizontal detection of TCAS, i.e. tau and taumod, have been
contrasted with the complexity metric.
A simple method for determining the range locus for specific
TCAS tau values, depending on relative speeds and encounter
angles, was defined. In addition, range values when detection
thresholds were infringed have been found to be similar, as well as
its sensitivity to relative angles.
Further work should be conducted for establishing a framework
for the evaluation and validation of this complexity metric. This
paper defines basic principles for an extended evaluation,
including multi-encounter scenarios and longer look ahead times.
Keywords: ATM; Separation Management; Collision Avoidance
TCAS; complexity; tau;
I. INTRODUCTION
ACAS (Airborne Collision Avoidance System) is the last
technical decision support tool for crews to prevent a Near Mid
Air Collision (NMAC) [1]. In the case that previous Air Traffic
Management (ATM) safety nets have failed, the system provides
resolution advisories to involved aircraft to remove the threat.
Currently, the technical implementation of ACAS is the
Traffic Collision and Avoidance System (TCAS). TCAS II [2],
last TCAS version, is mandatory within the ECAC airspace for
civil aircraft exceeding 5700 kg or authorised to carry out more
than 19 passengers.
TCAS II is a transponder-based system, independent from
ground systems, which analyses relative dynamics between pairs
of aircraft, and then, issues resolution advisories if required. The
system operational capabilities are limited by the traffic density,
up to 0.30 (aircraft/NM2), and by relative speeds for different
relative headings [1].
In regard to TCAS II limitations, SESAR and NextGen
forecasts predict higher traffic densities for future ATM
scenarios [3]. In addition, it has been proven that TCAS logic
failures may occur in multi-encounter scenarios [4].
Nonetheless, TCAS II has provided an excellent performance
for pair-wise encounters, with an outstanding impact on
reducing the risk of potential collisions.
AGENT (Adaptive self-Governed aerial Ecosystem by
Negotiated Traffic) is a SESAR 2020 Exploratory Research
granted project, which aims to develop a flight efficient, safe
collaborative and supervised separation management,
operationally integrated to trajectory management and collision
avoidance layers within a Trajectory Based-Operations concept.
AGENT is exploring solutions which will reduce or remove
main drawbacks of current TCAS II implementations.
A high-level Concept of Operations was defined [5] for
AGENT, in which new metrics were proposed for evaluating the
complexity of given scenarios. One of them is a revisited
version of the Intrinsic Complexity (IC) [6].
The purpose of this paper is to compare the performance of
TCAS horizontal detection indicator and the IC for a pair-wise
encounter at the transition zone between separation management
and collision avoidance layers, and it is organised as follows.
Section II establishes the background and states the problem.
Section III defines the methodology, while results are presented
in Section IV. Finally, conclusions are contained in Section V.
II. OVERVIEW AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. TCAS II Overview
TCAS II is the only certified implementation of the ACAS
function. The system works independently from ground,
conducting surveillance, tracking, threat detection and advisory
resolution.
TCAS II threat detection is partially based on an estimation
of the remaining time to the Closest Point of Approach (CPA)
between the ownship and an intruder [7]. This estimation is
based on the computation of the ratio,   (tau), between the TCAS
observable, the slant range r, and the range variation, or closure
rate  ̇ (1).
  ≡ −
 
 ̇
(1)
Tau is complemented with a vertical tau, given by the ratio
between vertical separation and the vertical closure rate. Then,
TCAS detection is activated when both tau and vertical tau are
less than a certain threshold, which depends on a fixed
Sensitivity Level (SL). A SL is required to find a compromise
between essential and pointless advisories. As a consequence,
the SL characterises the protection volume around the ownship,
which also depends on the relative dynamics between both
aircraft.
Two main problems of the tau definition arise when the
range closure rate or the vertical closure rate are very low. In
these cases, aircraft could be in a short range but the indicator
will not exceed the alert threshold. In addition, similar problems
may arise when there exist high closure rates but large miss
distances. For removing those, tau is slightly modified to
incorporate the DMOD (Distance MODification) (2).
     ≡ −
        
  ̇
(2)
TCAS II presents two main limitations. Firstly, it was
designed for densities up to 0.30 (aircraft/NM2). Secondly, it has
been proven that under certain circumstances, TCAS logic may
fail due to multi-encounter situations [8]. In addition, there may
arise critical scenarios due to non-coherent interaction with other
safety nets, as ATC, e.g. the Überlingen accident [9]. Although
now is mandatory for crews to follow TCAS clearances, there
have been several researches highlighting that interacting safe
independent systems may become into a unsafe one [10], [11].
AGENT seeks for an enhanced TCAS operationally
integrated with the separation management layer. A multi-agent
approach is followed for determining negotiated trajectories to
solve complex scenarios. AGENT aims at identifying not only
pair-wise encounters but cluster of aircraft which are
interdependent, to conduct a simultaneous resolution for all
aircraft, as it has been previously studied that consecutive
conflict resolution may result in unsafe situations [12].
Cluster detection, tracking and resolution would be managed
based on complexity criteria. Although several studies have
undertaken the subject, such as [12]-[13], there is no strict
definition of air traffic complexity. Additionally, scenarios
evolving from separation management towards collision
avoidance should ideally be solved with compatible actions for
all aircraft, independent at which safety net aircraft are. To this
end, an equivalent metric for threat identification is required, in
order to establish the state of the aircraft relative to the different
safety nets.
B. Proposed Complexity Metric
AGENT preliminary proposed complexity metric is based
on the Intrinsic Complexity indicator, presented in [14]–[16], in
which air traffic is modelled as a Dynamical System, defined by
the following equation:
 ̇ =  ( ) (3)
Where   and	 ̇ are position and velocities for the set of
aircraft. In the surrounding area of an aircraft m, located at   ,
(3) can be rewritten as:
 ̇ −  ̇  =    ∙ (  −   ) +    	 ≈    ∙ (  −   )
(4)
Where    represent the Jacobian matrix for  ( ) at point  
if smooth behaviour is assumed.   denotes aircraft coordinates
in the vicinity of the aircraft m, and  ̇ the speed of the flow of
aircraft at point   . Thus, if an analogy with a linear dynamic
system is done,   =    and   =   , the homogeneous part of
(4) reflects the impact of velocity upon aircraft position, whereas
the independent part represents the drift of the aircraft flow at
  .
The analysis of A matrix facilitates the visualization of
traffic relative dynamics. Thus, real parts of eigenvalues
associated with A at    determine the convergence or
divergence of the traffic flow at that location. When the
eigenvalue is negative, the traffic is considered to be contracting.
Further details could be found in [5] and [16].
Within the scope of this paper, pair-wise encounters are
considered. Figure 1 represents a typical pair-wise encounter
geometry, where [(cos( ) , cos( ) , cos( )] is a unitary vector
pointing from the ownship (aircraft m) to the intruder. Then, if
V, [Vx Vy Vz], indicates their relative speed, the closure rate  ̇
could be expressed as:
 ̇ =    ∙ cos( ) +    ∙ cos( ) +    ∙ cos( ) (5)
In these conditions, and for a pair-wise encounter, (4) could
be expressed as follows:
[ ̇−  ̇ ] =   ∙   ( )   ∙   ( )   ∙   ( )  ∙            
     
  ∙ [ −   ]
(6)
Figure 1. Typical pair-wise encounter geometry
Therefore, A has a triple eigenvalue, and consequently,
solution for equation (4) is:
  =    ∙    ∙   ( )   ∙   ( )   ∙   ( )  ∙ 
It could be observed that in the case where aircraft are
converging, the eigenvalue equals to 	 
 
.
Now, the metric is based in two considerations. On the one
hand, it reflects the rate of convergence of the traffic flows. On
the other hand, it is complemented with a measurement of the
traffic density. Further explanation can be found on [5]. Thus,
the metric for aircraft m is defined as follows:
    =       ∑     	(   , / ) ∙   	(   , / )    	   ∙
 ∑      ∙    (   ( ))    	  
(7)
The first part of the formula retains the notion of “air traffic
density” in terms of volumetric density.   and H are
characteristic horizontal and vertical distances respectively, and
    and ℎ   represent the lateral and vertical distances to
aircraft n.
The second part reflects the degree of convergence for a
particular traffic flow in a point of the airspace.     denotes a
characteristic reaction time for the Separation Management
layer whereas    ( ) represent the eigenvalue k of A matrix. The
multiplication between the eigenvalues and    	embodies the
severity of the situation. If a scenario is close to a NMAC, then
this value have an exponential increase.
If now we consider only a pairwise encounter and the closure
rate in its scalar form, the horizontal component of (7) is
transformed to:
    ≅  1 +     ∙  (   	( 
 
, ))         ∙   
   =    ∙     
(8)
III. METHODOLOGY
A. Comparison Method
TCAS II and IC-based indicators are compared analysing
their response under different initial conditions for ownship and
intruder. The model will consider constant speeds for both
ownship and intruder, and also, the vertical component of the
slant range is ignored.
For conducting the evaluations, an “ideal” encounter model
is formulated in which threat indicators will be reflected. Then,
as both indicators will trigger events-based alerts, magnitudes
associated with each of them will be computed when thresholds
are reached, such as aircraft range or the time-to-go to the CPA,
depending on the relative speeds and track angles.
B. Encounter model
The present work uses a simple model for an aircraft
encounter scenario (see Figure 2). Relative positioning of both
aircraft, the ownship position at Closest Point of Approach
(CPA) has been considered as the reference for the coordinates
of a Cartesian system, where distances are given in NM, and X
axis is oriented in the direction of the ownship velocity.
In this system, initial positions for both aircraft depends on
their velocities, assumed as constant, and on the time to CPA
(    ) as well. Thus, initial states of the ownship and the intruder
are given by:
    ⃗ (  ) = −   ∙      ∙  ⃗
    ⃗ (  ) =    ∙  ⃗
    ⃗ (  ) =    ∙      ∙ (cos( ) ∙  ⃗ + sin( ) ∙  ⃗)
     ⃗ (  ) = −  (cos( ) ∙  ⃗ + sin( ) ∙  ⃗)
(9)
Where indexes 1 and 2 refer to ownship and intruder
respectively. Velocities are ground speeds given by their
modules (   and    correspondingly). Finally, the angle   stands
for the incidence angle for the intruder regarding the X axis
(ownship speed direction). Unitary vectors  ⃗ and  ⃗ are oriented
in X and Y directions respectively.
Both aircraft follow then a linear motion, in which their
positions are given by:
    ⃗ ( ) =     ⃗ (  ) +     ⃗ (  ) ∙  
    ⃗ ( ) =     ⃗ (  ) +      ⃗ (  ) ∙  
(10)
Figure 2. Reference System for a pair-wise encounter with CPA at Origin
C. TCAS Detection Model in the CPA reference model
TCAS conducts different functions, and among them, threat
detection. To present a Traffic Advisory (TA), or issue a
Resolution Advisory (RA), the TCAS detection function
analyses, among others, the parameter τ (tau) defined in (1).  
Tau is given by the rate between aircraft slant range and the
closure rate between both aircraft. In other words, it estimates
the remaining time to the CPA.
Previous studies ([17], [18]) examined TCAS indicators by
analysing the relative motion between both aircraft. Following
the same approach, and taking into account previous definitions
(9), (10), the horizontal range and its closure rate could be
expressed as follows:
       ⃗ ( ) =        ⃗ (  ) +         ⃗ (  ) ∙  
       ⃗ (  ) =         ⃗ =      ∙ (   ∙ cos( ) + 	   ) ∙  ⃗ +
     ∙    ∙ sin( ) ∙  ⃗
        ⃗ (  ) =          ⃗ = − (   ∙ cos( ) + 	  ) ∙  ⃗ −    ∙ sin( ) ∙  ⃗
(11)
Where        ⃗ ( ) and         ⃗ (  ) stand respectively for the relative
position and relative speed of the intruder with respect to the
ownship. Note that         ⃗ is also constant. Now, range and closure
rate are given by:
‖       ⃗ ( )‖ =  (          ⃗ ∙         ⃗) + 2  ∙ (        ⃗ ∙          ⃗ ) +    ∙ (         ⃗ ∙      )       ⃗
‖       ⃗ ( )‖̇ = (          ⃗ ∙          ⃗ ) +   ∙ (           ⃗ ∙          ⃗ )‖       ⃗ ( )‖
(12)
If now (1) and (12) are combined, tau could be expressed as
follows:
  = (    +     − 2 ∙    ∙    ∙ cos( )) ∙ (     −  ) (    +     − 2 ∙    ∙    ∙ cos( )) ∙ (     −  )=      −  
(13)
Then, for a given tau, the range between both aircraft for a
given   could be expressed as follows:
‖       ⃗ ( )‖ =  (    +     − 2 ∙    ∙    ∙ cos( )) ∙ (  −     ) =   (  ,   , ) ∙ (     −     )=   (  ,   , ) ∙  
 (  ,   , ) = (    +     − 2 ∙    ∙    ∙ cos( ))
(14)
Equation (14) determines the locus of the range of an
intruder triggering an alert / resolution advisory for different
levels of sensitivity of TCAS.
Now, modified taumod can be expressed following a similar
approach. Thus, (2) is transformed to:
     =  (  ,  , )∙(      )        (  ,  , )∙(      ) (15)
Figure 3.              Sensitivity with  .
In this case depending on the initial relative motion of both
aircraft,      is reached at different     _   . For a given value
of      ,      is determined by the following expression:
(     −     _   ) =     2 ∙ (1 + 1 + 4 ∙       (  ,   , ) ∙ (    ) 
(16)
And then range is given again by expression        ⃗      _    .
D. Intrinsic Complexity in the CPA reference model
Intrinsic Complexity has been introduced previously, see
(8). For two aircraft encounter, the metric contains two different
components, that is to say, horizontal complexity and vertical
complexity. In the framework previously established, the
former is defined as follows:
    =  1 + ( 2) 
 max( 2 , ‖       ⃗ ‖)    ∙      ∙ 
         ⃗ ∙        ⃗
‖        ⃗ ‖
   
(17)
Where R indicates a characteristic distance, defining a
surrounding area associated to the aircraft. Following (11) and
(12), equation (17) can be expressed as follows:
   ( ) =  1 + ( 2) 
 max( 2 ,  (  ,   , ) ∙ (     −  ))    ∙      (      )
(18)
There are two possible cases for (18), depending on the
relative distance between both aircraft. In case that  
 
>‖       ⃗ ‖,
then
   ( ) = 2 ∙      (      )
(19)
On the contrary, i.e. ( 
 
≤ ‖       ⃗ ‖), the metric is formulated as
follows:
   ( ) = (1 +   4 ∙ 1 (  ,   , ) ∙ (     −  ) ) ∙      (      )
(20)
As for the      case, in order to obtain the range locus for a
given threshold based on this metric, the process below is
followed.
Firstly,     , which is the time when the threshold is exceeded,
is derived. Then, range is obtained, given again by        ⃗ (   ). For
cases where  
 
>‖       ⃗ ( )‖, the following expression applies:
    =       −    
   
   
 
 
  (21)
Otherwise, the expression is defined as follows:
   ∙ (  ,  , )∙(      ) 
 
 
 
 
 
    ∙ (  ,  , )∙(      )  −  
   
         = 0 (22)
And then,     is obtained by numerically solving (22).
IV. EXPERIMIENTAL DATA AND RESULTS
A. Parameters selection
Parameters influencing on studied indicators ( ,      and
    ) are established in this section. These three indicators are
function of   ,    and  . In addition,      is affected by DMOD
whereas for     ,     and   are the parameters playing a main
role.
Figure 4 Range Locus for different indicators.
Top   = 35 , middle      = 35 and, bottom     = 35.
For this example,    will be equal to 600 Knots. It has been
selected in order to reflect TCAS Maximum Closing Speed
(closure rate) conditions for traffic with opposite headings (see
Table 3-1 of [1]).
For DMOD, a SL = 7 is considered as it reflects the scenario
which will be handled by AGENT. Therefore, DMOD is equal
to 1.1 NM. Finally, for R and    , values of 5NM and 120 s are
chosen. The former represents the radius used for defining the
high-density volume around the aircraft which is limiting TCAS,
and for the latter [1], 120 s characterises the typical late-phase
of the separation management layer of ATM.
B. Complexity Metric Threshold
In order to compare the three indicators, a reference value
for the intrinsic complexity should be chosen. In order to do so,
values for the CM and      for two high-speed aircraft, in this
case 600 Knots, have been compared. Although those speeds are
unrealistic, the same criterion of reflecting the maximum
Closing Speed for TCAS has been followed.
For a SL=7, the threshold for issuing a RA are 35 seconds.
In order to study the behaviour of both metrics,      is
intersected with the intrinsic complexity. Approximately, both
indicators intersect for aircraft with opposite headings when
     is equal to 35 seconds, which also corresponds to a value
of 35 for the intrinsic complexity.
Then, the comparisons among  ,      and     are
evaluated for the same value of 35 (seconds in the case of tau,
and dimensionless for the intrinsic complexity).
C. Range comparison
To solve formulae (14), (16) and (21)-(22),    is fixed, and
then different values for    and   are studied. Comparisons are
presented by charts in polar coordinates, where the radial axis
indicates   , and the angle represents  .
In the case of  , the result, (13) establishes a direct linear
relation between   and t. It reflects that   only represent the exact
time-to-go to the CPA when both aircraft are in perfect collision
opposite headings and assuming constant speed. Therefore,
range between ownship and intruder is directly given by
selecting a Sensitivity Level for TCAS.
The upper locus in Figure 4 presents the range values when
tau equals 35 seconds. With this reference system, for all
considered intruder speeds and thetas, tau is equal to 35 seconds
and it is equivalent to the time-to-go to the CPA. It can be
observed how the range decreases as the module of the relative
speed does. In the first column of Table I, Table II and Table III
different range values depending on    and   are shown. It
reflects expected results as the maximum range occurs when
aircraft are in opposite headings at maximum speed, which
results in a relative speed of 1200 Knots.
For      and    , equations (16) and (21)-(22) are solved
in order to obtain      and     for different values of    and  .
Then, the range equation is propagated for the previously
obtained time series. As a result, range values for the
distributions of    and   are shown in the central and bottom
charts of Fig. 2.
Analysing qualitatively the three cases, it can be observed
that the three indicators behave similarly, in terms of the aircraft
range at the moment of crossing the threshold.
More precisely, in Table I, Table II and Table III ranges are
compared for different values of   and   . Results reflect that
for opposite headings, the CM is slightly delayed with regard to
     , about 1.5 seconds. The same situation occurs when theta
is 90 degrees, but in this case, the difference is significantly
reduced, and never implies more than 1 second of delay. In the
case of close to parallel trajectories (small theta angles), or
overtaking situations, the CM is crossing the threshold before
than the other two metrics, and always the range is higher than
the DMOD.
TABLE I. RANGE BETWEEN OWNSHIP AND INTRUDER FOR THETA =
0 AND TAU, TAU_MOD, CM = 35.
V2
[Knots]
Range [NM] for Tau, Tau_Mod, CM = 35.
Theta = 0
tau tau_mod CM
300 8.75 8.78 8.63
400 9.72 9.75 9.55
500 10.69 10.72 10.48
600 11.67 11.69 11.4
TABLE II. RANGE BETWEEN OWNSHIP AND INTRUDER FOR THETA =
90 AND TAU, TAU_MOD, CM = 35.
V2
[Knots]
Range [NM] for Tau, Tau_Mod, CM = 35.
Theta = 90
tau tau_mod CM
300 6.52 6.57 6.54
400 7.01 7.05 7.00
500 7.59 7.63 7.54
600 8.25 8.29 8.16
TABLE III. RANGE BETWEEN OWNSHIP AND INTRUDER FOR THETA =
180 AND TAU, TAU_MOD, CM = 35.
V2
[Knots]
Range [NM] for Tau, Tau_Mod, CM = 35.
Theta = 180
tau tau_mod CM
300 2.92 3.02 3.24
400 1.94 2.09 2.33
500 0.972 1.22 1.17
600 0 undetermined 0
D.      and CM sensitivy with  
In Figure 3 it is represented the evolution of      and CM
relative to the time-to-go to the CPA. Different trends, for     
(red) and CM (blue), for   changes are shown. For both
indicators, as   increases, starting from 0, curves are moving to
the left, i.e. the threshold is crossed earlier. This can also be
interpreted as, when the module of the relative speed decreases,
both curves move to the left.
Let’s now consider the time for which the Traffic Advisory
threshold is reached. Figure 3 shows how both metrics behave
in the same manner, although for opposite and same heading
scenarios, time differences when the TA is issued are slightly
different. In addition, it could be seen how TA would be
triggered earlier for the CM metric. Finally, for selecting the CM
threshold the same criteria than for RA threshold selection has
been followed. In this case, a      threshold of 45 equals
approximately to a CM value of 15.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Intrinsic Complexity applied to detect threats at the late
phase of the Separation Management layer, closed to TCAS
layer, has been presented. The aim of this paper was to assess
the coherence between threat detection indicators, provided by
the complexity metric and TCAS indicators, and to determine
whether or not the proposed complexity metric can allow an
operational integration in the detection process between
Separation Management and the Collision Avoidance layers.
A simple encounter model has been presented to this
purpose, to ease the evaluation of the indicators for pair-wise
encounters. It has been shown that the proposed horizontal
complexity metric and TCAS      behave similarly, in terms
of the range between aircraft when alert thresholds are reached
for all relative angles and speeds.
In addition, results show the well-known dependence of
TCAS   and      with relative speeds and encounter angles.
When relative speeds decrease and heading angles become more
similar, the range at the alert threshold also is reduced. The
introduction of      mitigates derived problems, such as alerts
are issued earlier when aircraft tend to identical headings.
For the complexity metric, the same performance is observed
in terms of range and time to the CPA when resolution advisories
would be issued. For traffic advisories, the complexity metric
triggers the alert earlier for same headings than for opposite
ones. This feature facilitates an increased situational awareness
for the late separation management phase as it identifies
complex scenarios with low deterioration rates.
To conclude, preliminary analysis of the proposed horizontal
complexity metric shows that it derives to TCAS horizontal
indicator at the transition stage between separation management
and collision avoidance layers. As a result, resolution actions
based on complexity could remove the risk of non-coherent
actions issued by different safety nets, if TCAS is considered an
independent and fixed one.
Further work should be conducted in order to determine the
evolution of the intrinsic complexity for multi aircraft
encounters and to incorporate the three-dimensional problem.
Finally, a process for late resolution clearances that are coherent
with TCAS ones should be defined
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